Hello, Hi Visionaries!

Here's the thing about the Super League collapse: it's the cleanest case study you'll find on how governance structures defend themselves against disruption and win.

In April 2021, twelve major clubs attempted a breakaway European Super League designed to sit outside UEFA's Champions League. Within 48 hours, it imploded. By February 2026, even the holdouts (Real Madrid, Barcelona) had formally withdrawn or reached settlement agreements with UEFA.

The interesting takeaway from a governance perspective: UEFA then adopted the exact format innovations the Super League promised (more matches, bigger fixtures, single league table) whilst keeping the institutional architecture intact.

The Super League promised a "founder" model. Permanent access for elite clubs, more marquee fixtures, and centralised commercial control. Think NBA franchise logic applied to European football.

The problem is that football runs on a merit-based pyramid. Promotion, relegation, and qualification through domestic leagues aren't just features. They're what makes football football, The beautiful game. When you propose replacing that with a closed shop, you're not innovating the product; you're challenging the constitution.

The backlash was immediate:

Within 48 hours, English clubs withdrew. The project collapsed.

The Super League's core product was "fans want more big games and constant jeopardy". And UEFA proved it by adopting a near-identical format.

The new Champions League (launched 2024/25):

Sound familiar? That's because it's the Super League pitch delivered through a different governance vehicle.

The lesson: The idea wasn't the problem. The governance structure proposing it was.

UEFA didn't win on sentiment alone. It won because it had institutional architecture the Super League couldn't match:

UEFA operates through a Memorandum of Understanding with the European Club Association (now rebranded as European Football Clubs post-2026). Clubs have formal roles on the Club Competitions Committee and representation on the UEFA Executive Committee which reduces exit incentives.

UEFA and FIFA historically controlled prior approval for new competitions. Whilst the Court of Justice of the European Union later ruled (December 2023) that these rules lacked sufficiently transparent and objective criteria, that power still shaped the 2021 outcome by raising the cost of defection.

UEFA's federated structure. National associations, domestic leagues, political cover created a broad stakeholder coalition. When the English clubs pulled out, the Super League lost critical mass immediately.

UEFA's squad cost ratio (capped at 70% from 2025/26) and broader Financial Sustainability Regulations create discipline mechanisms that reduce "financial doping" incentives. It's not just about policing spend. it's helps align incentives across the ecosystem.

The Super League wasn't just a commercial dispute. It exposed fundamental tensions in European governance:

Once the Court of Justice of the European Union became involved, football governance entered the same arena as antitrust cases against Big Tech, energy market liberalisation, and airline competition regulation. Football stopped being "just sport" and became European market infrastructure.

Control over elite football also represents control over:

The UK government's public opposition and subsequent moves towards an Independent Football Regulator signalled that football clubs were being treated as strategic cultural assets, not private entertainment businesses. That's geopolitics X sport.

The ABA emerged in the 1960s as a credible competitor to the NBA, introduced innovations like the three-point shot and slam dunk contest, and ultimately led to a 1976 merger with four ABA teams joining the NBA.

Could the Super League have followed a similar path? In theory, yes. They’d have had to prove a superior entertainment model, force UEFA to either merge or formally license a parallel competition with revenue-sharing bridges.

But football isn't basketball:

So whilst the ABA pressured innovation, the Super League triggered political resistance rather than market adoption.

1. Transparent Authorisation Rules for New Competitions
Objective criteria, clear timelines, appeal routes, proportional sanctions, exactly what the CJEU ruling identified as missing.

2. Separation of Powers
Stronger visible separation between rule-maker/regulator (UEFA) and commercial operator (UEFA Club Competitions SA, which manages media and sponsorship rights). This reduces conflict-of-interest arguments.

3. Structured Fan Interest Protections
Minimum standards on consultation, ticketing, match scheduling, and heritage protections, so innovation doesn't sacrifice the product.

4. Licensed Challengers Framework
Allow alternative formats within a governed sandbox (pilot competitions, limited-term licences) rather than forcing all-or-nothing breakaway dynamics.

5. Calendar & Player Load Governance
Clearer accountability for congestion externalities. Clubs, leagues, and UEFA all share blame when "more matches" becomes "more injuries."

The Super League didn't fail because it promised more big games. It failed because it couldn't credibly answer three questions:

UEFA then adopted the product innovations, more jeopardy, more fixtures. All whilst keeping sporting merit and stakeholders intact.

Institutions that can absorb external pressure whilst maintaining legitimacy can survive any disruption.

This newsletter is for informational purposes only and is not financial or business advice in any capacity. The information shared is our thoughts & opinions and does not represent the opinions of any other person, business, entity, or sponsor. The contents of this newsletter also should not be used in any public or private domain without the authors express permission.